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THE TOTAL TAKINGS MYTH 
Lynn E. Blais* 
 
For almost thirty-five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to 
carve out a total takings doctrine within its regulatory takings jurisprudence.  
Most regulatory takings claims are evaluated under the “ad hoc” three-
factor test first articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York.  Exceedingly few of these claims are successful.  But the Court has 
identified certain categories of government actions that are compensable 
takings per se, otherwise known as total takings.  This began in 1982 with 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., where the Court held that 
a land use ordinance requiring a landowner to endure a permanent physical 
occupation of a portion of her property is always a compensable taking.  Ten 
years later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that 
a land use restriction depriving an owner of all economically viable use of 
her property is also compensable per se.  Finally, in 2015, in Horne v. 
Department of Agriculture, the Court extended its total takings jurisprudence 
to personal property, announcing that the government appropriation of 
personal property is a per se compensable taking. 
Although the Court has had more than three decades to articulate 
theoretical justifications for its total takings jurisprudence and to provide 
guidance for lower courts in determining when a regulation constitutes a 
total taking, it has failed to do so.  This failure reflects the underlying reality 
that the total takings doctrine is a myth.  More particularly, the categories 
that the Court has identified as constituting total takings are analytically 
incoherent, and the terms the Court has used to demarcate total takings from 
regulations that are not per se compensable cannot be applied in the real 
world.  As a result, lower courts struggle to apply the total takings doctrine 
and the case law remains in utter disarray.  In fact, lower courts have 
resorted to creating “shadow” total takings doctrines that rely on obvious 
distortions of the plain meaning of outcome-determinative terms and deflect 
attention from the fundamental question of whether compensation is 
warranted. 
This Article argues that the Court’s attempt to create a total takings 
doctrine has failed, and that the Court should repudiate it.  It demonstrates 
that the Court’s initial total takings opinions were conceptually incoherent 
and woefully undertheorized.  And it shows that attempts by lower courts to 
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rehabilitate the doctrine by crystallizing the bright-line rules through careful 
and consistent application were doomed to, and did, fail.  This Article also 
explains why the entire enterprise was misguided from the start.  Although 
bright-line rules have their place, it is not in the heart of regulatory takings 
doctrine, which is premised on concerns for fairness and justice in 
distributing the burdens of land use regulation. 
Last term, the Court had a perfect opportunity to begin the process of 
repudiating the total takings myth.  Murr v. Wisconsin was a run-of-the-mill 
regulatory takings case masquerading as a Lucas-type total takings claim, 
and it presented the Court with a vehicle to either remedy the central 
doctrinal incoherence of Lucas’s bright-line rule or to overrule Lucas and 
turn its attention to the much needed task of clarifying and refining the Penn 
Central test.  Instead, by offering a new multifactored test in a sort of 
regulatory takings “step zero,” the Court in Murr merely exacerbated the 
core flaws of the Lucas bright-line rule.  Now, more than ever, it is imperative 
that the Court recognize and begin to dismantle the total takings myth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a takings case involving an 
obscure New Deal government program regulating, of all things, the sale of 
raisins.1  This little raisin dispute had been mired in the federal courts for 
more than twelve years and last term it reached the nation’s highest court a 
second time.2  While the actual dispute between the raisin growers and the 
Raisin Administrative Committee appears to have been resolved,3 Horne II 
ultimately raises more questions than it answers. 
In Horne II, the Court purported to add yet another bright-line rule to its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, holding that any physical appropriation of 
personal property is a per se taking and therefore categorically compensable.4  
In light of the total takings holding in Horne II, the Court now recognizes 
three circumstances in which government regulation of property is always a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.5  In addition to the Horne II rule—that 
physical appropriation of personal property is a per se taking—the other two 
categories of government regulation that require compensation per se are 
those that deprive a landowner of all economically viable use of her land6 
and those that impose a permanent physical occupation on real property.7  
According to the Court, each of these three types of regulations is 
categorically different from the mine-run of governmental restrictions on 
property rights because it deprives the property owner of the core interests 
that constitute property ownership.8 
The Court’s “total takings” jurisprudence comprises these three 
circumstances.9  By contrast, regulations limiting the use of real and personal 
 
 1. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (Horne II). 
 2. The first time the case went to the Supreme Court, the issue was jurisdictional.  The 
Court held that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) provides a 
comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over takings claims 
brought as a defense to AMAA fines.  Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (2013) 
(Horne I). 
 3. The Court declined to remand the case to a lower court to assess takings damages, 
noting that “[t]his case, in litigation for more than a decade, has gone on long enough.” Horne 
II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433.  Instead, the Court set damages itself, effectively terminating the 
litigation. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2430–31 (holding that the government’s demand that the Hornes turn over a 
percentage of their raisins without charge for the government’s control and use is a unique 
taking that requires compensation). 
 5. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, “[n]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 6. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 7. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437 (1982). 
 8. See id. at 435 (“Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights 
‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’  To the extent that the government permanently occupies 
physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights.” (quoting United States v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))). 
 9. In Lucas, the Court announced the “categorical rule that total regulatory takings must 
be compensated.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.  Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in that case 
reduced this phrase to “total takings” several times. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Scholars have since referred to Lucas-type takings as “total takings,” but the phrase has not 
entered the common lexicon as a description of the Court’s three per se rules.  The term is 
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property that do not fit into one of the three categories—that are, in other 
words, not total takings—are analyzed using more nuanced tests in which the 
Court evaluates several factors.  Land use restrictions that do not deprive the 
land owner of all economically beneficial use or impose a permanent physical 
occupation are analyzed under an ad hoc, multifactored approach first 
articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.10  
Landowners rarely prevail in takings claims evaluated under the Penn 
Central three-factor test.11  Similarly, the Court considers many factors in 
evaluating takings challenges to the mine-run of governmental actions that 
impact personal property rights, and it has rarely held such restrictions to 
require compensation.12  Thus, the Court now purports to draw bright lines 
that identify three categories of government regulations that are total takings 
and therefore compensable per se, while all other governmental restrictions 
on the use of real and personal property are evaluated under multifactored 
tests and are rarely held to constitute compensable takings. 
However, since the Court first began its quest to carve out bright-line per 
se takings rules almost thirty-five years ago, scholars,13 courts,14 and even 
Supreme Court Justices15 have lamented the lack of doctrinal coherence and 
theoretical foundation in the Court’s total takings jurisprudence.  As these 
commentators have pointed out, the concept of a deprivation of all 
economically viable use requires a theoretical and practical understanding of 
the denominator to be used in the calculus.16  That is, a regulation prohibiting 
 
used here because it best describes what the Court claims to be doing in all three 
circumstances. 
 10. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 11. See David A. Dana, Why Do We Have the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule?, 39 VT. L. REV. 
617, 617 (2015) (“If the [diminution in value] is less than 100%, the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York ad hoc, contextual, multi-factor analysis applies, and 
generally the government prevails.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 U.S. 2419, 2438–40 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the Court’s approach to regulatory takings claims aimed at 
governmental restrictions in the use of personal property that is “a fungible commodity for 
sale”). 
 13. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 
118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 602 (2014); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1088 
(1993). 
 14. See, e.g., City of Coeur d’Alene v. Simpson, 136 P.3d 310, 319 (Idaho 2005) 
(“Identifying the denominator parcel is no easy task.”); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751,768 (Pa. 2002) (“As we have noted above, the Supreme Court 
has not instructed conclusively how the denominator problem should be resolved.”).  
 15. Even the majority in Lucas conceded that the bright-line rule it created lacked 
theoretical coherence. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1008, 1016 n.7. (1992) 
(“Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule is 
greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against 
which the loss of value is to be measured.”); see also id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In 
short, the categorical rule will likely have one of two effects:  Either courts will alter the 
definition of the ‘denominator’ in the takings ‘fraction,’ rendering the Court’s categorical rule 
meaningless, or investors will manipulate the relevant property interests, giving the Court’s 
rule sweeping effect.”). 
 16. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central:  The Need for 
Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 480 (2001) (“Lucas is 
factually narrow and conceptually vague.  Consequently, the case does not clearly guide and 
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development on one acre of wetlands in the corner of a five-acre lot can be 
viewed as depriving the landowner of 100 percent of that acre of land or 20 
percent of the entire lot.  The Court has not provided a doctrinal explanation 
or theoretical foundation for choosing one view or the other.17  Similarly, no 
regulation that imposes a physical occupation on a landowner, such as the 
requirement that she allow a cable company to attach a cable to her apartment 
building, is ever truly permanent in the metaphysical sense of the word.  But 
the Court’s limited attempt to define what counts as a permanent physical 
occupation versus a temporary physical invasion for per se takings purposes 
is theoretically incomplete, and what little theory the Court has offered does 
not even explain the outcomes in its own cases applying the rule.18  The new 
per se rule announced in Horne II is similarly undertheorized and impossible 
to reconcile with prior cases. 
Rather than add to the now-copious scholarship criticizing or attempting 
to rehabilitate the Court’s total takings jurisprudence, this Article argues that 
the Court should acknowledge that its attempt to draw bright-line rules in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence failed at its inception and should abandon 
the total takings enterprise altogether.19  Notwithstanding the Court’s 
continued insistence that there are categories of government regulation that 
require compensation per se without consideration of any other factors, this 
Article contends that no such categories exist.  Because the total takings 
categories have no theoretically coherent content or boundaries, lower 
courts20 have been forced to make sense of nonsensical standards.  In doing 
 
limit lower courts.  Instead, Lucas performs the symbolic function of strongly endorsing the 
value of property rights and criticizing regulatory excess while also allowing regulation to 
restrict the use of property in a wide range of circumstances.”); Danaya C. Wright, A New 
Time for Denominators:  Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings 
Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVT’L L. 175, 180 (2004) (“The current approach to the 
denominator issue is . . . incoherent and illogical.”). 
 17. The Court has not just failed to provide an answer to “this difficult question,” it has 
actually “produced inconsistent pronouncements” and often simply declined to address the 
question. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (“Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the 
composition of the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent 
pronouncements by the Court. . . .  In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present 
case . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Professor Michael McConnell recently suggested that the Court abandon its Lucas 
holding as well. See Michael W. McConnell, The Raisin Case, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 313, 
318 (“The total-loss rule has long been recognized as a conceptual disaster area, incapable of 
objective and consistent administration.  It should be abandoned where it now holds 
sway . . . .”). 
 20. Because the Court’s takings jurisprudence is applied in both federal and state courts, 
and state courts are not inferior tribunals to the U.S. Supreme Court, the term “lower courts” 
is not a strictly accurate way to refer to the courts that are forced to wrestle with the Supreme 
Court’s total takings myth.  However, “[a]n overwhelming majority of states whose 
constitutions or statutes contain provisions similar to the Takings Clause have interpreted these 
provisions as encompassing regulatory takings, and these states have used the analytical 
framework developed by the United States Supreme Court when adjudicating regulatory 
takings claims.” Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. 2014).  In this 
context, state courts are subordinate to the Supreme Court.  Therefore, this Article refers to 
both lower federal courts and state supreme courts as “lower courts.”  Some states, however, 
have interpreted the takings clauses in their own state constitutions as providing greater 
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so, lower courts crafted shadow total takings doctrines that distort the 
language the Court used to carve out the categories in the first instance and 
now incorporate other factors—some of which are inconsistent with the total 
takings cases—to determine whether a regulation constitutes a total taking.  
Thus, the jurisprudence of total takings is a myth, and continued attempts to 
bring coherence to the concept are both futile and counterproductive. 
The unveiling of the total takings myth is not merely an exercise in 
semantics.  The myth exerts powerful influence over the scope and extent of 
regulatory takings litigation and property ownership practices in several 
ways.  First, the Court’s resort to a vocabulary of bright lines and categorical 
takings obfuscates its regulatory takings jurisprudence.  By focusing its 
attention on total takings doctrine for the past thirty-five years, the Court has 
evaded its obligation to provide much-needed guidance on the resolution of 
mainstream regulatory takings claims.  Eliminating the per se rules will force 
courts to face the difficult issues still plaguing regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.  Second, the allure of using a bright-line rule and a potential 
per se takings holding encourages litigants to attempt to shoehorn their 
mainstream regulatory takings claims into one of the total takings categories.  
This litigation strategy forces lower courts to wrestle with lines that cannot 
logically be drawn.  As a result, lower courts have developed and adopted 
creative interpretations of the Court’s total takings language that often 
subsume many of the Penn Central factors into the decision whether to apply 
the categorical rule at all.  In doing so, these courts introduce extraneous 
factors into the total takings inquiry and thus detract from, rather than refine 
and develop, the Penn Central test.  Third, the Lucas total takings doctrine 
encourages landowners to engage in conceptual severance by structuring 
ownership interests in novel and economically inefficient ways to take 
advantage of the Lucas rule if those interests are impacted by future 
regulation.21 
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I lays out the history of the Court’s 
attempt to draw bright-line rules for total takings beginning with Loretto in 
1982 and ending with Horne II in 2015.  Next, Part II examines the theoretical 
weaknesses inherent in each total takings rule—weaknesses that were 
apparent from the conception of the rule and have been the subject of much 
judicial and scholarly commentary since.  Then, Part III explores the 
challenges lower courts face trying to implement the Court’s theoretically 
incoherent bright-line rules and the creative but ultimately detrimental ways 
they have responded.  Finally, the Part IV argues that the Court should 
repudiate rather than rehabilitate the total takings doctrine because bright-
line rules have no rational place in regulatory takings jurisprudence and the 
 
protection to property owners and requiring compensation for regulatory takings in more 
circumstances than would be required by federal precedents.  For a fascinating empirical study 
of the broader, richer world of state court regulatory takings cases, see generally James E. 
Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
35 (2016). 
 21. See generally Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of Lucas:  Making or Breaking a Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV.1847 (2017). 
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myth of their existence is detracting from the robust development of the Penn 
Central analysis.  This section also demonstrates that overruling Lucas 
requires nothing more than a straightforward application of the Court’s 
settled jurisprudence for remedying its constitutional errors. 
I.  BRIGHT-LINE RULES AND TOTAL TAKINGS 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in part, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”22  
Although there has been much debate about the original meaning of the 
Takings Clause and its historical application,23 the story of bright-line rules 
and the total takings doctrine is relatively succinct and straightforward. 
For its first one hundred years, the application of the Takings Clause 
generated “surprisingly little debate.”24  During that time, it was generally 
accepted that the provision applied only to circumstances in which the 
government actually took title to a landowner’s real property.25  In 1871, in 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,26 the Court first applied the Takings Clause to a 
government action that did not take title to real property, holding that a statute 
authorizing construction of a dam that resulted in the permanent flooding of 
the claimant’s real property caused a taking.27  Then, in 1922, in 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,28 the Court held for the first time that the 
application of a regulation that merely limits a landowner’s use of her 
property, without taking title or physically invading it, could also constitute 
a taking.29  In an opinion wisely characterized as “more practical than 
theoretical in its focus,”30 the Court in Mahon set forth the remarkably 
unhelpful “general rule” that, “while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”31  In that 
case the Court held that a Pennsylvania law prohibiting coal companies from 
mining the support estate, which they owned as a separate estate under state 
law, effected a compensable taking.32 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 23. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT:  HOW TO REVIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008) (arguing that except in very 
limited circumstances the Takings Clause bars the government from acting in ways that 
diminish the value of private property); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 
(1995) (arguing that the original understanding of the Takings Clause was that it “required 
compensation when the federal government physically took private property, but not when 
government regulations limited the ways in which property could be used”). 
 24. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 
1009 (2003). 
 25. Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 1081. 
 26. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
 27. Id. at 177–81. 
 28. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 29. Id. at 414–16. 
 30. Fee, supra note 24, at 1015. 
 31. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
 32. Id. at 416. 
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After Mahon, more than fifty-five years passed before the Court offered 
further guidance on how to determine when a regulation “goes too far.”33  In 
1978, in Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal argued that the 
application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, which 
severely restricted their attempts to develop their iconic property to maximize 
its value, was a compensable taking.34  In rejecting this claim, the Court 
acknowledged that “[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable 
difficulty,” and that the Court resolved takings cases by “engaging 
in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”35  Nonetheless, the Penn Central 
Court set forth three factors that have particular significance:  (1) “[t]he 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” 
and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”36  The Court went on to 
note that a “‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”37 
These three factors are now generally referred to as the Penn Central 
factors, and this short paragraph represents the last serious guidance the Court 
has offered to assist lower courts in resolving regulatory takings claims.  As 
the Court said in 2005, “[t]he Penn Central factors—though each has given 
rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines 
for resolving regulatory takings claims.”38 
Since announcing the Penn Central test, the Court has studiously avoided 
resolving the “vexing subsidiary questions” generated by its three-factor test.  
Instead, it has devoted its Takings Clause attention to identifying cases that 
do not fall within the ambit of the Penn Central test at all.  Beginning in 1982, 
the Court decided a series of cases in which it drew a bright line between 
government actions that constitute total takings, which categorically call for 
just compensation, and those that are merely partial interferences with 
property rights, which are evaluated under the Penn Central factors.  The 
total takings cases are discussed in turn below. 
A.  Permanent Physical Occupations 
The Court announced its first bright-line rule in 1982 in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.39  In that case, the landowner 
challenged a 1973 New York statute prohibiting landlords from interfering 
with the installation of cable television equipment on their property or 
demanding a payment from the cable company in excess of the amount set 
 
 33. Id. at 415. 
 34. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 119 (1978). 
 35. Id. at 123–24. 
 36. Id. at 124 (citations omitted). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
 39. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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by state regulation.40  Loretto owned an apartment building in New York City 
and after the cable company attached two cable boxes and a cable line to her 
building she filed suit, claiming that the application of the statute to her 
property was a compensable taking.41  The New York Court of Appeals 
applied the Penn Central factors to Loretto’s claim and, concluding that the 
economic impact of the regulation was not excessive and that the regulation 
did not interfere with any investment-backed expectations, held that the cable 
access ordinance did not constitute a taking for which compensation was 
required.42 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a regulation that imposes a 
permanent physical occupation on real property is a categorical taking 
requiring compensation per se.43  The Court made clear that the land use 
restriction at issue in Loretto was not a total taking simply because it entailed 
a physical invasion.44  Rather, the determinative factor was that the physical 
invasion imposed by the statute was permanent rather than temporary.45 
The Court justified this bright-line rule by explaining that a permanent 
physical occupation was, in effect, a total taking.  The Court explained: 
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights “to 
possess, use and dispose of it.”  To the extent that the government 
permanently occupies physical property, it effectively destroys each of 
these rights.  First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space 
himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and 
use of the space.  The power to exclude has traditionally been considered 
one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.  
Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the 
owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot 
exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the 
property. . . .  Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal 
right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent 
occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any 
value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the 
property.46 
Of course, the taking was total with respect to only a very tiny portion of 
Loretto’s property.  The two cable boxes were affixed to a small segment of 
the roof, occupying only “about one-eighth of a cubic foot of space on the 
roof of [Loretto’s] Manhattan apartment building,”47 and the cable line 
dangling down the front of the building was less than half an inch in 
 
 40. Id. at 424. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 426. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (“[W]e have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property 
restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause.  Our cases 
further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent 
physical occupation, a taking has occurred.”). 
 46. Id. at 435–36 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). 
 47. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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diameter.48  Still, with respect to that tiny portion of Loretto’s real property, 
the Court held that the taking was total and therefore compensation was 
required.  It stated that “constitutional protection for the rights of private 
property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently 
occupied.”49 
B.  Deprivation of All Economically Beneficial Use 
The Court announced its second bright-line total takings rule ten years after 
the first.50  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,51 the Court held that 
a regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of her 
land is a per se taking.52  Again, the Court justified the rule in total takings 
language, reiterating its claim that total takings are categorically 
compensable without regard to other factors. 
Lucas owned two residential beachfront lots in South Carolina, which he 
bought for $975,000 in 1986.53  In 1988, South Carolina enacted the 
Beachfront Management Act, which prevented Lucas from building any 
habitable structures on his property.54  The trial court held that this restriction 
“deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, . . . eliminated 
the unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them valueless.”55 
Lucas sought compensation for a regulatory taking.  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court analyzed Lucas’s claim under the three Penn Central factors 
and added a fourth factor, the nature of the state’s interest in the regulation, 
which the court identified from prior U.S. Supreme Court cases.56  
Ultimately, the state court concluded that the fourth factor was determinative 
and held that the regulation was not a taking because it was “designed to 
prevent serious public harm.”57 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 436. 
 50. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  Although the Court 
in Lucas claimed that it was simply applying a long-standing rule that had never been 
determinative in a takings case but had been asserted repeatedly in many, id. at 1016 n.6 
(1992), most commentators agree with the Lucas dissent’s assertion that this case was the first 
to recognize this bright-line rule, see, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13 at 1080. 
 51. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 52. Id. at 1015. 
 53. Id. at 1006. 
 54. Id. at 1007. 
 55. Id. at 1009. 
 56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991); see Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (finding prohibition against excavating below the water 
table in order to extract gravel not a taking when weighing public interest); Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (analyzing the “public interest” to find that state action 
destroying diseased cedar trees of certain property owners to prevent the infection of apple 
orchards is not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (weighing the 
“good of the community” to find that an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks near 
residents in Los Angeles did not effect a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 
(1887) (analyzing the community interest in a takings claim about the prohibition on the 
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors). 
 57. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 901. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, announcing a new bright-line rule and 
creating the second category of government action that constitutes a total 
taking.  The Lucas Court held that “where regulation denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land,” it is categorically compensable without 
regard to any case-specific factors.58 
Although the Court had never expressly applied this bright-line rule in the 
past, it announced it in Lucas as if it were simply reiterating established 
doctrine and, therefore, did not have to offer extensive reasons for the rule.59  
But as with the justifications for the bright-line rule announced in Loretto, 
the sparse reasoning the Court did offer for the Lucas rule sounded in total 
takings:  “We have never set forth the justification for this rule.  Perhaps it is 
simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use 
is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical 
appropriation.”60 
C.  Physical Appropriations 
The 2015 Horne II decision is the latest case in the Court’s total takings 
jurisprudence.61  Marvin and Laura Horne grow raisins.62  Since the New 
Deal, raisin sales in the United States have been extensively regulated by the 
Department of Agriculture through the use of “Marketing Orders.”63  In most 
years, the marketing order for raisins requires growers to give a percentage 
of their crops to the U.S. government.64  The amount required to be given to 
the government (called “reserves”) is determined by the Raisin 
Administrative Committee, “a Government entity composed largely of 
growers and others in the raisin business appointed by the Secretary of 
Agriculture.”65  The Raisin Administrative Committee acquires title to the 
reserve raisins and decides how to dispose of them at its discretion.66  Options 
for disposal include selling them in noncompetitive markets, donating them 
to charitable causes, releasing them to growers who agree to reduce their own 
 
 58. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 59. Id. at 1016 (“As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated 
when land-use regulation ‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land.’” (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 260 (1980))).  Interestingly, the Court has since repudiated the first half of this statement, 
acknowledging that the question whether a government regulation “substantially advance[s] 
legitimate state interests” sounds in due process, not takings law. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005). 
 60. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. 
 61. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015). 
 62. Actually, the Hornes “handle” raisins too, and the marketing orders at issue in this 
case technically apply only to raisin handlers.  But by custom in the industry handlers pass on 
the entire cost of the marketing-order regime to growers.  The Hornes became raisin handlers 
before beginning this litigation so that they could challenge the costs that the marketing orders 
were imposing on them as growers. Id. at 2424. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  Whether such a committee, made up of politically unaccountable industry insiders, 
can constitutionally exercise the power of eminent domain is an interesting topic for another 
article. 
 66. Id. 
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raisin production, or disposing of them by “any other means” consistent with 
the purposes of the raisin program.67  The order typically also provides that 
the raisin producers retain the right to the “net proceeds from the disposition 
of reserve tonnage raisins”68 and requires that the reserve raisins be sold “at 
prices and in a manner intended to maxim[ize] producer returns.”69 
In 2002, the Hornes challenged the reserve requirement by refusing to set 
aside any raisins for the government.70  The government sent trucks to the 
Hornes’ facility and demanded the raisins, but the Hornes refused to turn 
them over.71  As a result, the government assessed a fine against the Hornes 
equal to the value of the reserves they had refused to turn over to the 
government—approximately “$480,000—as well as an additional civil 
penalty of just over $200,000” for their failure to obey the government’s 
marketing order.72  The Hornes challenged both fines, claiming that the 
reserve requirement was a per se taking of their personal property.73 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Hornes’ argument that the reserve 
requirement was a per se taking, reasoning that “the Takings Clause affords 
less protection to personal than to real property” and concluding that the 
Hornes “are not completely divested of their property rights” because 
growers retain an interest in the proceeds from any sale of reserve raisins by 
the Raisin Administrative Committee.74 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Raisin Marketing Order’s 
requirement that the Hornes turn over a portion of their raisin crop to the 
government is a physical appropriation that categorically calls for 
compensation.75  The Horne II Court brushed off intimations in prior cases 
that real property should be treated differently from personal property76 and 
held that the physical appropriation of personal property is a per se 
compensable taking.77 
Although its prior cases had created considerable confusion over whether 
regulations of personal property should be subject to the same takings 
standards as regulation of real property, the Court treated its decision in 
Horne II as an unremarkable application of the direct appropriation 
jurisprudence that applies to real property.  According to the Court: 
There is no dispute that the “classic taking [is one] in which the government 
directly appropriates private property for its own use.”  Nor is there any 
dispute that, in the case of real property, such an appropriation is a per se 
taking that requires just compensation.  Nothing in the text or history of the 
 
 67. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 989.67(b)(5) (2015). 
 68. Id. § 989.66(h). 
 69. Id. § 989.67(d)(1). 
 70. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2424. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2425. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 75. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2425–28. 
 76. Id. at 2427–28; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 
(1992). 
 77. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2430. 
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Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different 
when it comes to appropriation of personal property.  The Government has 
a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as 
when it takes your home.78 
This facile analogy fails to acknowledge, however, that there are many 
cases in which the Court has held that Government can indeed take title to 
personal property—including, in fact, your car79—without paying just 
compensation.  Thus, Horne II actually announced a new bright-line rule 
applicable to the physical appropriation of personal property, rather than 
simply applying the well-settled rule of eminent domain.  Unfortunately, as 
with the Court’s first two bright-line rules, the line dividing the total taking 
in Horne II from noncompensable appropriations of personal property is 
hardly bright at all. 
II.  THE MYTH OF BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
In announcing these three bright-line rules and establishing its 
jurisprudence of total takings, the Court sought to define categories of 
government restrictions on property rights that are, in every instance, the 
theoretical and functional equivalent of taking title to the property.  Providing 
clear definitions of these categories, the Court reasoned, would permit lower 
courts, land owners, and government actors to carve out from the difficult 
realm of regulatory takings analysis those cases that could be identified and 
resolved with relative ease.80 
Unfortunately, it turns out that the bright-line rules demarking government 
regulations that are total takings from those restrictions that are evaluated 
under the ad hoc Penn Central factors are actually quite unclear.  Rather, the 
Court’s total takings cases are analytically inconsistent with other cases in 
which it declined to find a per se taking, and its total takings jurisprudence is 
insufficiently theorized.  Thus, the Court’s purported bright-line rules are 
actually blurry standards lacking analytic rigor and theoretical content. 
A.  Permanent Occupations Versus Temporary Invasions 
In announcing the first bright-line rule applicable to permanent physical 
occupations, the Court in Loretto viewed the rule’s application as a 
straightforward exercise.  Indeed, the Court stated that ease of line drawing 
was a virtue of its new rule:  “whether a permanent physical occupation has 
occurred presents relatively few problems of proof,” because “[t]he 
 
 78. Id. at 2425–26 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Tahoe–Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002)). 
 79. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452–53 (1996) (holding that the 
government can order the forfeiture of a car used by a husband in criminal activity even if the 
car was jointly owned by the wife who knew nothing about the crime and rejecting the wife’s 
claim that the taking of her interest in the car required just compensation). 
 80. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436–38 
(1982) (explaining that the permanent physical occupation rule “avoids otherwise difficult 
line-drawing problems” because determining “whether a permanent physical occupation has 
occurred presents relatively few problems of proof”). 
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placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that 
will rarely be subject to dispute.”81  Notwithstanding the Court’s confidence 
in the clarity and simplicity of its new bright-line rule, however, the 
elusiveness of the line between a permanent physical occupation and a 
temporary physical invasion can hardly be overstated. 
The Court in Loretto emphasized that it was the permanent nature of the 
regulatory invasion in that case that rendered it a per se taking.  To make that 
point clear, the Court distinguished two recently decided cases that involved 
temporary, rather than permanent, physical invasions that therefore did not 
implicate the total takings rule—Kaiser Aetna v. United States82 and 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.83  In Kaiser Aetna, the Court applied 
the Penn Central factors in holding that the government’s imposition of a 
navigational servitude requiring public access to a previously private pond 
was a compensable taking.84  The Court affirmed that reasoning in Loretto, 
noting that “the easement of passage, not being a permanent occupation of 
land, was not considered a taking per se.”85  Similarly, in Pruneyard, the 
Court applied the Penn Central factors to a state constitutional requirement 
that shopping center owners permit individuals to enter their property to 
exercise free speech and petition rights on their property, and concluded that 
the land use restriction was not a compensable taking.86  In Loretto, the Court 
distinguished Pruneyard the same way it distinguished Kaiser Aetna—by 
noting that the physical invasion was “temporary and limited in nature,” and 
therefore not a per se taking.87 
Notwithstanding the Court’s insistence that the per se rule offers a bright 
line distinguishing between permanent and temporary physical invasions, 
that distinction is far from clear.  Indeed, even the attachment of the cable 
boxes and cable lines to Loretto’s property obviously was not permanent in 
the common sense meaning of that word.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “permanent” as “[c]ontinuing or designed to continue or last 
indefinitely without change; abiding, enduring, lasting; persistent.  Opposed 
to temporary.”88  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary concurs, 
defining “permanent” as “continuing or enduring without fundamental or 
marked change; stable.”89  As the dissent in Loretto pointed out, however, 
the statute at issue “[did] not require [Loretto] to permit the cable installation 
forever, but only ‘[s]o long as the property remains residential and a CATV 
company wishes to retain the installation.’ This is far from ‘permanent.’”90  
In that sense, therefore, the cable boxes and cable line in Loretto are no more 
“permanent” than the boaters in Kaiser Aetna or the picketers in Pruneyard—
 
 81. Id. at 437. 
 82. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
 83. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 84. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180. 
 85. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433. 
 86. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 96. 
 87. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434. 
 88. Permanent, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 89. Permanent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006). 
 90. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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intrusions that the Loretto Court said were temporary, not permanent.  Just 
as the intrusion by the cable company could last for a long time or end 
tomorrow, so too could the intrusions by the boaters and picketers. 
After Loretto, then, it appeared that what the Court meant by permanent 
was something more like fixed:  the cable box in Loretto was a fixed 
attachment to Loretto’s property, while the boaters in Kaiser Aetna and the 
picketers in Pruneyard were transient passers-through. 
Unfortunately, attempts to make sense of the Court’s Loretto total takings 
doctrine based on fixed versus transient invasions were nullified just five 
years later by Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,91 in which the Court 
held that an easement of ingress and egress is a permanent physical 
occupation.92  In Nollan, a beachfront landowner challenged the imposition 
of a condition on his building permit that required him to convey an easement 
of ingress and egress across his privately owned beach.93  Nollan argued that 
the easement requirement was a taking for which compensation was due and 
that California could not evade the compensation requirement by making the 
easement grant a condition on Nollan’s home remodel building permit.94 
Although Nollan is best known for announcing the essential nexus 
requirement for conditions on permits, for our purposes the most interesting 
part of Nollan is the Court’s relatively offhand holding that an easement is a 
permanent physical occupation.  Observing that “perhaps because the point 
is so obvious, we have never been confronted with a controversy that required 
us to rule upon it,” the Court stated that “a permanent physical occupation” 
occurs for purposes of the bright-line rule “where individuals are given a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property 
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is 
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.”95 
However, contrary to the Court’s observation, it had been presented just a 
few years earlier with not one, but two controversies involving takings 
challenges to government actions that imposed permanent rights of access on 
real property.  It held in both those cases that the easements were temporary 
invasions, not permanent occupations.  In 1979, the Court had applied the 
Penn Central factors to the government’s imposition of an easement of 
ingress and egress on a private pond in Kaiser Aetna.  In 1980, the Court had 
applied those same factors to a right of access to a privately owned shopping 
center in Pruneyard.  And in 1982, the Court had affirmed those cases in 
Loretto by noting that the easements of passage were temporary physical 
invasions, not permanent physical occupations. 
Yet in Nollan, the Court announced that an easement of passage is self-
evidently a permanent physical occupation, without overruling Kaiser Aetna 
or Pruneyard.  Indeed, the Nollan Court did not seriously attempt to 
distinguish either of those cases.  Rather, in a three-sentence footnote, the 
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Court asserted that Pruneyard “is not inconsistent” with Nollan “since there 
the owner had already opened his property to the general public, and in 
addition permanent access was not required,” and that Kaiser Aetna “is not 
inconsistent because it was affected by traditional doctrines regarding 
navigational servitudes.”96  Because neither of these statements (which 
cannot really be called explanations) address the temporal distinction 
between permanent and temporary occupations, neither shed any light on 
why the Court concluded that the rights of passage in Pruneyard and Kaiser 
Aetna are less permanent than the right of passage in Nollan. 
Moreover, the Court’s holding in Nollan that the right-of-way at issue in 
that case was categorically different from the rights-of-way at issue in Kaiser 
Aetna and Pruneyard put to rest the Court’s claim in Loretto that the line 
between permanent physical occupations and temporary physical invasions 
would be easy to draw.  After Nollan, the concept of a permanent physical 
occupation, which is a total taking, is no longer limited to “[t]he placement 
of a fixed structure on land or real property”97 but may sometimes include 
the imposition of an easement of passage in which people come and go across 
private property at various times. 
B.  Deprivation of All Economically Viable Use 
and the Denominator Problem 
As with the Loretto bright-line rule, the Lucas bright-line rule became 
blurry in the very opinion in which it was announced.  Although in Lucas the 
Court buried its disclaimer in a footnote, the majority was well aware that it 
had announced an unworkable rule.  As the Court conceded: 
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our “deprivation of all economically 
feasible use” rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make 
clear the “property interest” against which the loss of value is to be 
measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would 
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all 
economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one 
in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as 
a whole.98 
Justice Blackmun elaborated on the denominator problem in his dissent: 
The threshold inquiry for imposition of the Court’s new rule, “deprivation 
of all economically valuable use,” itself cannot be determined objectively. 
As the Court admits, whether the owner has been deprived of all economic 
value of his property will depend on how “property” is defined. The 
“composition of the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction” is the 
 
 96. Id. at 832 n.1. 
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dispositive inquiry. Yet there is no “objective” way to define what that 
denominator should be.99 
Moreover, just as the Court neglected in Nollan to explain or overturn its 
inconsistent prior permanent physical occupation cases, the Court failed in 
Lucas to reconcile its new rule with prior cases that had made inconsistent 
pronouncements about the appropriate denominator.  For example, in Mahon, 
the case that first acknowledged the possibility of a compensable regulatory 
taking, the Court held that a law restricting the subsurface extraction of coal 
from the support estate was a compensable taking because the support estate 
was recognized as a separate legal estate in Pennsylvania and the law 
“purport[ed] to abolish” the entire support estate.100  In contrast, sixty-five 
years later in Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis,101 the Court held 
that a nearly identical law was not a taking because the support estate 
comprised only a small percentage of all the coal the company owned, 
without overruling Mahon.102  While the Court acknowledged this 
inconsistency in Lucas, it chose not to resolve it.103 
Indeed, Lucas compounded the confusion over the denominator issue by 
questioning the continued viability of one of the Court’s prior denominator 
holdings without overruling it.  In Penn Central, the Court rejected the 
claimant’s attempt to engage in “conceptual severance” of its property 
holdings and instead evaluated the impact of the challenged regulation on the 
“parcel as a whole,” which, according to the Court, consisted of the entire 
“city tax block designated as the ‘landmark site.’”104  In particular, Penn 
Central made clear that: 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have been entirely abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block 
designated as the ‘landmark site.’105 
 
 99. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Frank Michelman, 
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The Court walked back that statement in Lucas, calling it “an extreme—
and . . . unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus.”106  But by merely 
questioning, rather than overruling, Penn Central on this fundamental issue 
the Lucas Court obfuscated, rather than clarified, the denominator issue. 
Since Lucas, the Court has only exacerbated the denominator enigma.107  
One year after the Lucas decision the Court again embraced a broad view of 
the relevant denominator and rejected the claimant’s argument that the 
denominator should be defined by the scope of the property taken.108  The 
Court pointed out that, “[t]o the extent that any portion of property is taken, 
that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is 
whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in 
question.”109  And then, in 2002, the Court once again relied on what it had 
called in Lucas an “unsupportable . . . view of the relevant calculus”110 to 
reject a Lucas total takings claim in Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.111  In Tahoe–Sierra, the Court rejected 
the property owner’s attempt to engage in conceptual severance over time, 
holding that temporary restrictions on a parcel are not “total takings” for the 
period in which the restriction is in effect.112 
Most recently, in Murr v. Wisconsin,113 the Court further confused the 
denominator dilemma and undermined any pretense that Lucas created a 
bright-line rule by adopting a vague and subjective multifactored test to 
identify the appropriate denominator in regulatory takings cases.  In Murr, 
the common owners of two contiguous lots subject to a county land use 
restriction argued that the restriction constituted a Lucas total taking of one 
of the lots and that the lower court erred in treating the two lots together as 
the relevant denominator.114  The Court rejected this argument and held that 
the lower courts had been correct in treating the two parcels as the relevant 
denominator for the regulatory takings inquiry.  In doing so, the Court offered 
a new multifactored test to help lower courts identify the appropriate 
denominator.  Under Murr, to determine the appropriate denominator, lower 
courts should:  (1) “give substantial weight to the treatment of the land, in 
particular how it is bounded and divided, under state and local law”; (2) “look 
to the physical characteristics of the landowner’s property”; and (3) “assess 
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the value of the property under the challenged regulation, with special 
attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.”115  
These vague, subjective factors hardly bring clarity to the already confused 
denominator dilemma.  Moreover, the Court tethered the denominator factors 
to considerations that are already part of the Penn Central inquiry, inviting 
lower courts to double count these factors or to engage in merits inquiries at 
the denominator stage.   
In particular, the Court in Murr explained that, in applying its 
multifactored denominator test, a court should focus on “the reasonable 
expectations of an acquirer of land,” “reasonable private expectations,” 
whether “the property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to 
become subject to, environmental or other regulation,” and whether the 
regulation of one lot increases the value of the landowner’s other lots or is 
“unmitigated.”116  Even these considerations “may not exhaust the list of 
potentially relevant factors” because the “Court also emphasize[d] that ‘the 
reasonable expectations at issue derive from background customs and the 
whole of our legal tradition.’”117  Thus, the Murr test not only fails to resolve 
the denominator dilemma but also essentially incorporates important aspects 
of the Penn Central test—including “the whole of our legal tradition”—into 
the denominator inquiry.118  And, of course, the fact that this multifactored 
test is to be applied before the Lucas inquiry effectively undermines any 
plausible assertion that Lucas created a meaningful bright-line rule. 
Thus, the Lucas total takings rule purports to draw a bright line between 
regulations that deprive a landowner of all economically viable use of her 
property and those that do not.  But even after its latest attempt in Murr, the 
Court has failed to provide a workable standard or meaningful theoretical 
guidance for determining the appropriate denominator for that inquiry.  This 
theoretical gap at the heart of the Lucas total takings rule is so enormous that 
one scholar has called it a “conceptual black hole.”119 
C.  Physical Appropriations, Retained Interests, 
and Concomitant Government Benefits 
The bright-line rule announced in Horne II—that a government regulation 
effecting a direct appropriation of personal property is a categorical taking—
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suffers from theoretical and analytic shortcomings as problematic as those 
plaguing the Loretto and Lucas total takings rules.  Like those rules, the 
Horne II rule lacks a coherent theoretical foundation, cannot be reconciled 
with the Court’s prior cases, and will be impossible to apply in the future. 
First, the Court’s reasoning as to why the reserve requirement is a total 
taking is plainly wrong.  As noted above, the Horne II Court offered this 
platitude as one reason for finding a total taking:  “The Government has a 
categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when 
it takes your home.”120  But in Bennis v. Michigan,121 the Court held that the 
government did not have to pay just compensation for taking a car from its 
owner.122  The Court rejected a takings claim from a woman who owned a 
joint interest in a car that was forfeited as an abatable nuisance following her 
husband’s use of the car for prostitution.123  It was undisputed in Bennis that 
the wife had a separate property interest in the car and had no knowledge of, 
or culpability in, her husband’s criminal activity.124  Even so, the Court held 
that the forfeiture of the wife’s property interest in the car was not a taking 
requiring compensation because “[t]he government may not be required to 
compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired 
under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent 
domain.”125  The Hornes’ raisins, of course, were acquired under the exercise 
of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain—the 
Raisin Marketing Order.  But the Court offered no explanation for why the 
abatable nuisance authority rendered the takings claim invalid in Bennis, 
while the authority of the Raisin Marketing Order was irrelevant in Horne II. 
Similarly, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent in Horne II, the 
government’s appropriation of the Hornes’ raisins is not a “total” 
appropriation as that term is used in Loretto.126  The Loretto Court based its 
total takings rule on its contention that a permanent physical occupation 
destroys each of the sticks in the property bundle of rights—the rights “to 
possess, use and dispose of” the property.127  When the Government required 
the Hornes to turn over some of their raisins to satisfy the reserve 
requirement, it did not take every aspect of their ownership interest.  Under 
the Raisin Marketing Order, the Hornes retained the right to profit from the 
reserve raisins when the Government disposed of them.  Thus, the reserve 
requirement is more like the regulation at issue in Andrus v. Allard,128 which 
the Court held was not a compensable taking.129 
In Andrus, merchants who traded in bald eagle feathers used in Native 
American artifacts challenged a regulation that prohibited all commercial 
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transactions in parts of certain birds as a means to prevent the destruction of 
those species.130  Because of the difficulty of determining when such bird 
parts were acquired, the regulation prohibited commercial transactions in all 
regulated bird parts, even those that had been acquired lawfully before the 
enactment of the statute.131  The merchants claimed that the ban on selling 
their “pre-existing” bird parts (bald eagle feathers) was a total taking because 
it completely deprived them of the opportunity to earn a profit from their 
artifacts.132  The Court rejected that claim, holding that because the owners 
retained some rights to the artifacts—in particular the right to possess, 
transport, donate, or devise them—the prohibition on sale was not only not a 
total taking, it was not a taking at all.133  The Court in Horne II failed to 
explain why the Hornes’ retained right to profit from their appropriated 
raisins is categorically different for takings purposes than those rights 
retained by Allard and other merchants. 
Finally, in Horne II the Court failed to persuasively reconcile its decision 
with prior cases holding that appropriations assessed as a condition on the 
receipt of a substantial government benefit are not compensable takings.  In 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,134 the Court relied on just that reasoning to 
reject Monsanto’s takings challenge to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s requirement that it disclose protected trade secrets as a condition 
for receiving a permit to sell its pesticides.135  The Court held that the 
government’s disclosure requirement was not a taking because Monsanto 
received a “valuable Government benefit” in exchange for the appropriation 
of its trade secrets.136  Horne II distinguished Monsanto with the conclusory 
assertion that “[s]elling produce in interstate commerce . . . is . . . not a special 
governmental benefit.”137  But, of course, the Hornes were not simply selling 
raisins in interstate commerce; they were selling raisins in a highly structured 
and controlled interstate market, tightly regulated to keep raisin prices high.  
In any event, Horne II sheds no light on the line to be drawn between 
appropriations that are not takings because they are conditioned on the receipt 
of a special benefit and those that are per se takings because they are not so 
conditioned. 
Thus, the Horne II total takings rule is the third instance of the Court’s 
futile attempt to use bright lines to carve out total takings islands within its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
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III.  BLURRY LINES IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Lower courts are confounded by the total takings myth.  The total takings 
per se rules may be the law of the land, but they are impossible to apply on 
their own terms.  Moreover, the Court’s opinions announcing these rules do 
not provide the theoretical foundation or analytic rigor needed for the lower 
courts to construct coherent operational doctrine based on the Court’s 
foundational pronouncements.138 
Consequently, lower courts have created a shadow jurisprudence of total 
takings to resolve cases involving total takings claims.  But the shadow total 
takings jurisprudence is problematic on many fronts.  In some circumstances, 
lower courts engage in semantic contortions so extreme that they undermine 
any claim to analytic consistency and reasoned decision-making.139  In other 
circumstances, lower courts import into their shadow total takings 
jurisprudence extraneous factors unrelated to the Court’s per se rules and 
divorced from the principles underlying the Takings Clause itself.  Finally, 
the entire shadow total takings enterprise detracts from the important work 
of developing a coherent regulatory takings jurisprudence built on the 
fundamental principles underlying the Takings Clause. 
This section highlights some of the difficulties caused by the lower courts’ 
efforts to apply Loretto and Lucas by analyzing the shadow doctrines of each 
case.140  It is not intended to be a comprehensive catalogue of lower court 
decisions in total takings cases, or even a thorough analysis of all the mischief 
that has been sown by the total takings myth.  The goal here is merely to 
demonstrate that the total takings myth has caused more problems than it has 
solved, and that the Court would do well to repudiate it. 
A.  The Shadow Loretto Doctrine 
Because the permanent-temporary line that the Court attempted to draw in 
Loretto simply cannot do the work set out for it, lower courts have had to 
resort to exceptional linguistic contortions to apply the Loretto per se rule.  It 
is generally agreed that the Loretto Court could not really have meant to draw 
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a bright line between permanent and temporary physical invasions, at least 
not in any temporal sense of those two terms.  Recognizing that there is no 
theoretically coherent way to determine when a physical invasion is 
permanent and when it is temporary in the common understanding of those 
terms, lower courts have simply redefined the word “permanent” to mean 
something else.  Some courts define “permanent” to mean “substantial” or 
“not inconsequential.”141  In doing so, however, these courts neglect a key 
premise of Loretto itself—that a permanent physical occupation is a taking 
regardless how inconsequential it is.  Other lower courts focus on the “fixed” 
nature of the cables in Loretto and equate “permanent” occupations with 
occupations that are “fixed.”  Those courts have created a shadow total 
takings doctrine that is inconsistent with Loretto’s progeny, most notably 
Nollan. 
In Hendler v. United States,142 for example, the Federal Circuit pointed out 
that no physical occupation is ever permanent and therefore looked to 
whether the challenged physical invasion was long-standing and substantial, 
as opposed to transient and relatively inconsequential, to determine whether 
it constituted a total taking under Loretto.143  Hendler challenged the EPA’s 
authorization of government agents to construct wells on private property to 
monitor and extract migrating hazardous substances from a Superfund 
cleanup site located nearby.144  The district court denied the landowner’s 
motion for summary judgment based on Loretto, stating that the court needed 
more information about the government’s “long-range intentions” regarding 
the wells before it could determine whether they were permanent or 
temporary invasions.145  The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for lack 
of jurisdiction and noted that, regardless of how much longer the wells would 
be on the claimant’s property, the intrusion already constituted a permanent 
physical occupation.146  According to the court, in a Loretto total takings 
inquiry “permanent does not mean forever, or anything like it.”147  Rather, 
the court explained that 
[a]ll takings are “temporary,” in the sense that the government can always 
change its mind at a later time . . . .  The long drawn out battle [over 
temporary versus permanent takings] was not a fight over principle, but a 
dispute over the illogical use of a word.  If the term “temporary” has any 
real world reference in takings jurisprudence, it logically refers to those 
governmental activities which involve an occupancy that is transient and 
relatively inconsequential, and thus properly can be viewed as no more than 
a common law trespass quare clausum fregit.148 
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The court concluded that the wells were “at least as ‘permanent’ in this sense 
as the CATV equipment in Loretto.”149 
While the Federal Circuit has at times attempted to cabin the broad 
language in Hendler,150 it continues to consider factors other than duration 
when applying the Loretto total takings test.  For example, in John R. Sand 
& Gravel Co. v. United States,151 it considered a landowner’s claim that the 
EPA’s erection of a security fence around a Superfund cleanup site 
constituted a permanent physical occupation.152  The fence was six feet tall 
and anchored to the ground with posts set forty-eight inches deep, but it had 
been moved several times during the course of the cleanup and was expected 
to be removed when the cleanup was complete.153  Thus, it was clearly not 
“permanent” in the sense of lasting forever.  Nonetheless, the court held that 
the fence was a permanent physical occupation, explaining that: 
“Permanent” has a special meaning in the determination of whether a 
physical occupation has occurred.  In the context of physical takings 
“‘permanent’ does not mean forever, or anything like it.”  A government 
occupation is “permanent” when the government’s “intrusion is a 
substantial physical occupancy of private property.”  The government’s 
occupation may be permanent even if it is not “exclusive, or continuous 
and uninterrupted.”154 
In perhaps the most striking substitution of the term “substantial” for the 
Loretto requirement of permanence, the Federal Circuit held in 2012 that a 
U.S. Border Patrol easement to install, maintain, and service underground 
sensors on private property constituted a “permanent physical taking” even 
though the easement was subject to termination by either party at any time.155  
In particular, the easement provided that the sensors would be removed when 
they were no longer needed by the Border Patrol or within thirty days after 
the landowner notified the Border Patrol that he wished to develop the 
property.156  Notwithstanding that the agreement between the parties 
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expressly provided for the impermanence of the sensors, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the trial court’s finding that physical invasion was not permanent.157 
State supreme courts have similarly declined to impart temporal relevance 
to the permanent-temporary distinction when reviewing Loretto total takings 
claims.  For example, in Benson v. South Dakota,158 the Supreme Court of 
South Dakota held that invasions that might well last forever did not 
constitute a per se taking under Loretto because they were “not fixed 
structures placed on the land.”159  In that case, landowners challenged a state 
statute permitting the shooting of small game from a public right-of-way.160  
The landowners claimed that the lawful hunting from the roadway left 
shotgun shells littered all over their property, and they argued that the shells 
constituted a permanent physical occupation and therefore a total taking 
under Loretto.161  The court rejected that argument, concluding that the “acts 
of the hunters result[ed] in temporary and intermitted [sic] physical invasions 
rather than a permanent occupation” because they were not “fixed physical 
structures.”162 
Thus, faced with the incoherence of the permanent-temporary distinction 
drawn by the Court in Loretto, lower courts have responded by incorporating 
concepts of substantiality and fixedness into their Loretto total takings 
inquiries and using these factors to determine whether a physical invasion is 
a total taking.  This shadow total takings doctrine seems eminently 
reasonable—whether a landowner should be compensated for a forced 
physical invasion of her property perhaps should depend on how substantial 
the invasion is or whether the invading item is fixed to the land.  However, 
that is not what the Court held in Loretto, and the facile substitution of 
“substantial” or “fixed” for Loretto’s requirement of “permanent” 
undermines the analytic rigor and legitimacy of the total takings test. 
In fact, the introduction of concepts of substantiality and fixedness into the 
Loretto test is inconsistent with Loretto and its progeny.  One of the most 
salient aspects of the Loretto decision was its rejection of substantiality as a 
factor in determining permanence.  As the Loretto Court insisted, “permanent 
occupations of land . . . are takings even if they occupy only relatively 
insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the 
landowner’s use of the rest of his land.”163  Subsequently, in Nollan, the 
Court made clear that easements of ingress and egress constituted permanent 
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physical occupations, even though such easements did not result in the 
attachment of any fixed physical structures on the landowner’s property.164  
Thus, the centrality of substantiality and fixedness to the lower courts’ 
shadow Loretto total takings doctrine is impossible to reconcile with the 
Loretto doctrine itself. 
B.  The Shadow Lucas Doctrine 
The Lucas total takings test has vexed the lower courts even more than the 
Loretto test.  This may be because land use regulations causing an economic 
impact are much more prevalent than regulations causing a physical invasion.  
Or, it may be because the Lucas total takings test invites landowners to 
engage in conceptual severance, either in their ownership instruments or their 
pleadings, in an attempt to recast virtually any land use restriction as one that 
deprives the property owner of all economically beneficial use of something.  
The Loretto total takings rule, in contrast, does not offer the landowner a 
similar opportunity for contrivance.  Either way, lower courts have devoted 
enormous resources to their attempts at applying the Lucas total takings rule, 
and their struggles have also generated a shadow total takings doctrine. 
The Supreme Court adopted its own shadow total takings doctrine for the 
Lucas bright-line rule last term in Murr.  The Murr multifactored test not 
only fails to resolve the denominator dilemma, but it neglects to analyze, 
reject, or build on, the extensive work lower courts have done since Lucas to 
address the issue.  Thus, lower courts will now be compelled to start anew, 
crafting a new Lucas shadow takings doctrine from the Court’s vague and 
subjective multifactored test.165 
Prior to Murr, three troubling trends had emerged in the Lucas shadow 
total takings jurisprudence in lower courts.166  First, some courts simply 
rejected Lucas’s insistence on drawing a bright line at 100 percent 
deprivation of economically viable use.  These courts have found a Lucas 
total taking even when the challenged land use regulation leaves some value 
remaining.  Second, and relatedly, courts disagree about the meaning of the 
doctrine’s central concept—economically beneficial use.  Some lower courts 
reason that in Lucas the Court meant to protect certain use values over others, 
while other courts conclude that the rule only applies if a landowner is left 
with no economically beneficial use of any kind.  Finally, because the Court 
provided no doctrinal or theoretical guidance on the denominator issue in 
Lucas, lower courts wrestled unsuccessfully with the intractable denominator 
dilemma.  The decision in Murr merely kicks that can down the road. 
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1.  Almost All Economically Beneficial Use 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Lucas shadow total takings 
doctrine is that some lower courts have simply ignored the Court’s 
admonition that a total taking occurs only in the extraordinarily rare case in 
which a land use restriction deprives the property owner of all economically 
beneficial use.  While this 100 percent threshold is problematic for a variety 
of reasons,167 the Court has steadfastly reaffirmed it.  In Tahoe–Sierra, the 
Court noted: 
[O]ur [Lucas] holding was limited to “the extraordinary circumstance when 
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.”  The 
emphasis on the word “no” in the text of the opinion was, in effect, 
reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical rule would not apply 
if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%.  Anything less than 
a “complete elimination of value,” or a “total loss,” the Court 
acknowledged, would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn 
Central.168 
Nonetheless, lower courts have not faithfully embraced that 100 percent 
threshold.  To the contrary, it is not uncommon for a lower court to conclude 
that a challenged regulation is a Lucas total taking even though it deprives 
the landowner of something less than 100 percent of the value of her property. 
For example, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,169 the Federal 
Circuit held that a land use restriction was a Lucas total taking even though 
the restriction did not deprive the land of all value.170  The government had 
denied the landowner’s application for a Clean Water Act § 404 permit to fill 
and develop wetlands on its property.171  The trial court had found that the 
denial of the permit reduced the fair market value of the land from over $2 
million to $12,500—less than 1 percent of the original value.172  Agreeing 
with the trial court’s conclusion that this remaining value was de minimis, 
the Federal Circuit held that the relevant parcel was “deprived of all 
economically feasible use” and therefore held that the permit denial was a 
total taking under Lucas.173 
In Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,174 (Lost Tree Village II) the 
Federal Circuit similarly held that a land use restriction constituted a Lucas 
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total taking even though it did not deprive the land of all of its value.175  Lost 
Tree Village II also involves a § 404 permit application, the denial of which 
left a small portion of the landowner’s holdings with only minimal residual 
value.176  After recognizing that the permit denial decreased the value of the 
property 99.4 percent from more than $4 million with a § 404 permit to 
$27,500 without the permit,177 the court concluded that the denial of the 
permit constituted a total taking under Lucas.178 
2.  Economically Beneficial Use Versus Sale Value 
The Federal Circuit’s rejection of Lucas’s 100 percent threshold is most 
likely the result of residual uncertainty over what type of value counts for 
purposes of the Lucas total takings test.  As noted above, Lucas held that a 
regulation that “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” 
is a per se taking.179  Unfortunately, in Lucas the Court also used other 
phrases to describe the boundary of its bright-line rule, including:  “denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land”180 and “eliminate[s] all 
economically valuable use.”181  Later, the Court described the Lucas test as 
requiring compensation whenever a regulation results in “the complete 
elimination of a property’s value.”182  Lower courts have struggled to 
implement the Lucas rule in close cases in part because they cannot make 
sense of these disparate directives.  Again, the complete lack of theoretical 
groundwork in Lucas leaves the lower courts without meaningful guidance 
to resolve this issue. 
For its part, the Federal Circuit has concluded that Lucas intended to 
distinguish between the value derived from economic or productive use of 
land and sale or market value when it defined a total taking as the deprivation 
of “all economically beneficial use.”  Thus, in Lost Tree Village II that court 
refused to consider residual sale value in applying the Lucas test and held 
that the denial of the § 404 permit constituted a total taking even though the 
property retained a market value of nearly $30,000.183  In doing so, the court 
distinguished Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,184 in which the Supreme Court 
found that a decrease in value of more than 93 percent was not a Lucas 
taking.185  The decision was not made not on the ground that the diminution 
in Lost Tree Village II was much closer to 100 percent than the diminution 
of value in Palazzolo, but rather because the type of value that remained in 
Lost Tree Village II was different from the type of value that remained in 
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Palazzolo.186 In rejecting the government’s argument that a landowner’s 
ability to sell a regulated parcel precludes a successful Lucas claim, the 
Federal Circuit stated: 
Even if we assume that Plat 57’s value necessarily enables Lost Tree to sell 
the parcel, we disagree that all sales qualify as economic uses.  When there 
are no underlying economic uses, it is unreasonable to define land use as 
including the sale of the land.  Typical economic uses enable a landowner 
to derive benefits from land ownership rather than requiring a landowner 
to sell the affected parcel.187 
The Ninth Circuit draws a similar distinction.  That court upheld a Lucas 
total takings jury finding even though the landowner was able to sell his 
restricted property for $800,000 more than he paid for it before the restriction 
was enacted.188  The Ninth Circuit explained the importance of the distinction 
between use value and sale value this way: 
Focusing the economically viable use inquiry solely on market value or on 
the fact that a landowner sold his property for more than he paid could 
inappropriately allow external economic forces, such as inflation, to affect 
the takings inquiry . . . .  Although the value of the subject property is 
relevant to the economically viable use inquiry, our focus is primarily on 
use, not value.189 
By contrast, other courts consider all possible uses or sources of value in 
applying the Lucas total takings rule. In District Intown Properties Ltd. v. 
District of Columbia,190 for example, the Federal Circuit explained—albeit 
in dicta—that a land use restriction prohibiting any construction on the lots 
constituting the lawn of a historic landmark would not effect a Lucas total 
taking because the landowner had not proved that the economic or market 
value of the lots was totally destroyed as a result of the restriction.191  
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit rejected a Lucas total takings challenge raised 
by the owner of hundreds of TouchPlay lottery machines after Iowa enacted 
 
 186. Lost Tree Village II, 787 F.3d at 1116–17 (“In Palazzolo, the 93% loss in value was 
insufficient to trigger Lucas because the landowner was left with value attributable to 
economic uses.”). 
 187. Id. at 1117. 
 188. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1432 (9th Cir. 
1996), aff’d, 526 U.S. 687 (1999).  Although the judgment in this case was affirmed, the Court 
addressed only the issue of whether it was error to submit the total takings question to a jury. 
 189. Id. at 1432–33. 
 190. 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 191. Id. at 882–83.  In his concurrence, Judge Stephen Williams took the majority to task 
for expressing this view, even in dicta, asserting that the majority “gratuitously takes an even 
harsher stance against compensation than does present law.” Id. at 890 (Williams, J., 
concurring) (“The majority finds that District Intown has failed to offer evidence that the 
regulation denies it ‘economically viable use of [the] land,’ even though the Mayor’s own 
agent found that ‘any construction that destroyed the lawn would be incompatible with the 
lawn’s status as an historic landmark.’  Thus, so long as the lawn is untouched, ‘economically 
viable’ uses are permissible.  It is hard to imagine what ‘economically viable’ use that 
constraint leaves, unless the majority means that the very barest thread of value, yielded by 
some thoroughly bucolic use, is enough to defeat a total takings claim.  By this standard, no 
regulation can ever effect a total taking, and at best will be tested only under the far weaker 
partial takings rubric.”). 
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legislation ending the TouchPlay lottery game, a legislative action that 
eliminated virtually all beneficial use and most of the sale value of the 
machines.192  Indeed, the trial court concluded that the machines “have 
virtually no market value outside Iowa” and only salvage value in Iowa.193  
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit held that the statute “did not deprive [the 
owner] of ‘all economically beneficial uses’ of its property.”194  The 
Supreme Court of South Carolina has also rejected a Lucas total takings claim 
because the challenged land use restriction left the landowner with residual 
recreation and conservation uses.195 
3.  The Intractable Denominator Dilemma 
By far the biggest challenge to implementing the Lucas total takings rule 
in the lower courts is the denominator dilemma.  Even if courts could agree 
on what types of value count for purposes of the Lucas total takings test, and 
whether residual sale or salvage value dooms a Lucas claim, to determine 
whether a challenged land use regulation deprives the owner of all 
economically viable use a court must first establish the appropriate 
denominator for the inquiry.196  This issue is at the heart of most Lucas 
claims.197  But, as explained above, the Lucas opinion provided neither 
practical nor theoretical guidance for this fundamental analytic step.198  As a 
result, lower courts have developed shadow Lucas total takings doctrines 
involving various multifactored tests to determine the appropriate 
denominator.  These shadow doctrines, in turn, have essentially swallowed 
Lucas’s purported bright-line rule, replacing it with multifactored inquiries—
 
 192. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 193. Id. at 441. 
 194. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)). 
 195. Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 737 S.E.2d 601, 614–18 (S.C. 
2013) (“On these facts, we find there was no categorical taking because the [land use 
restriction] permits numerous recreation and conservation uses, and Appellant has failed to 
produce any evidence that those permitted uses are not economically beneficial.”). 
 196. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) 
(“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken 
from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is 
determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of 
the fraction.’” (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))).  
The denominator problem at the heart of Lucas’s incoherence is not unique to the total takings 
myth.  Rather, the same challenge plagues one of the three Penn Central factors—determining 
the degree of interference with the landowner’s distinct investment-backed expectations.  
Thus, even if the Court overrules Lucas as a first step in repudiating the total takings myth, it 
will not render the denominator dilemma moot. See infra Part III. 
 197. To be clear, repudiating the Lucas total takings rule will not eliminate the denominator 
dilemma in regulatory takings cases because Penn Central’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations factor requires the determination of the relevant denominator as well.  But 
removing the distortion created by the total takings rule will facilitate clarification of the 
denominator issue in Penn Central cases. 
 198. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change:  The Constitutional 
Conundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2019 (2013) (“Despite the Court’s recognition of this 
crucial problem more than twenty years ago, it has—to date—never explained the reasons for 
its choices or otherwise attempted to resolve this issue.”). 
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different from the Penn Central multifactored inquiry—that resolve 
regulatory takings claims at the denominator stage, and Murr has merely 
entrenched this dilemma. 
The denominator dilemma is essentially an issue of conceptual severance.  
As the Ninth Circuit has explained: 
Property interests may have many different dimensions.  For example, the 
dimensions of a property interest may include a physical dimension (which 
describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional 
dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner may use or 
dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension (which 
describes the duration of the property interest).199 
Property owners engage in conceptual severance when they “delineat[e] a 
property interest consisting of just what the government action has removed 
from the owner, and then assert[] that that particular whole thing has been 
permanently taken” by the challenged regulation.200  Because the Court has 
issued conflicting opinions and offered inconsistent guidance on the issue of 
conceptual severance,201 lower courts must contend with landowners’ 
creative attempts to divide their ownership interests into the smallest legally 
protected units possible to enhance the likelihood of prevailing in a Lucas 
challenge.202 
Courts have, for the most part, rejected attempts at conceptually severing 
property along functional and temporal dimensions.  The Supreme Court 
itself rejected temporal conceptual severance in Tahoe–Sierra when it 
declined to apply the Lucas total takings rule to a thirty-two-month 
development moratorium.203  And while landowners have been creative in 
their attempts to claim a Lucas total taking based on functional conceptual 
severance, lower courts have been generally consistent in rejecting those 
 
 199. Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 774 
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 200. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:  Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988) (coining the phrase 
“conceptual severance” and providing the first sustained analysis of the problem of conceptual 
severance in this seminal article). 
 201. Id. at 1675–77 (discussing the Court’s inconsistent holdings regarding conceptual 
severance).  Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) 
(stating that “‘[t]aking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments 
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated”), with Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (treating an 
easement as a legally distinct property interest and holding that requiring a landowner to grant 
an easement over her property is a per se taking). 
 202. In a forthcoming article, Lee Fennell insightfully describes the denominator dilemma 
as an instantiation of a more general aggregation problem that runs through various legal 
doctrines. See Lee Anne Fennell, Accidents and Aggregates, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 52–53). 
 203. Tahoe–Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 (“Of course, defining the property interest taken in 
terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular.  With property so divided, every 
delay would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would 
constitute categorical takings.  Petitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument is unavailing 
because it ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus 
on ‘the parcel as a whole.’” (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31)). 
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attempts as well.  For example, in Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera,204 a 
Wyoming rancher argued that the state’s two-license limit on supplemental 
hunting licenses available to large landowners constituted a “complete 
evisceration of a single stick in the bundle of property rights—i.e., the right 
to hunt on one’s property” and was therefore a per se taking under Lucas.205  
The Tenth Circuit rejected the landowner’s attempt to conceptually sever his 
land into functional components and held that “the relevant denominator 
must be derived from the entire bundle of rights associated with the parcel of 
land.”206  However, until the Court clarifies its position on separating sticks 
from the bundle of rights for purposes of determining the denominator in a 
regulatory takings claim, landowners will continue to face incentives to 
present functional conceptual severance total takings claims in the lower 
courts.207 
The more persistent, and theoretically intractable, denominator problem in 
Lucas total takings cases involves geographical severance—the problem that 
Murr took on and failed to resolve.  Most land use restrictions apply to only 
a portion of a landowner’s total property holdings, either because the 
restriction applies to a portion of a lot or because the landowner owns more 
than one lot.208  When that occurs, landowners nonetheless often bring Lucas 
total takings claims using geographical conceptual severance to argue that 
the regulation has deprived them of all economically viable use of the 
restricted portion of their property. 
Two cases illustrate the denominator dilemma in the context of 
geographical severance and, at the same time, highlight the incoherence this 
dilemma brings to the Lucas total takings doctrine.  First, in Forest 
Properties, Inc. v. United States,209 the landowner brought a Lucas total 
takings challenge to the denial of a § 404 permit to dredge and fill a nine-acre 
lake on his sixty-two-acre tract.210  The landowner owned the lake and fifty-
three contiguous upland acres.211  He planned to build a residential 
development on the upland fifty-three acres and to dredge and fill various 
 
 204. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 205. Id. at 1577. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Compare Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (treating the mineral estate as 
a separate property interest from the rest of the fee for denominator purposes), with Penn Cent., 
438 U.S. at 130–31 (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated.  In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this 
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block designated as the 
‘landmark site.’”), and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501–
02 (1987) (rejecting the conceptual severance of the mineral estate from the rest of the fee for 
denominator purposes). 
 208. If a land use restriction eliminated the beneficial use of every portion of the entire 
holdings of a property owner, the Lucas test would be easily satisfied, and there would be no 
interesting litigation.  
 209. 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 210. Id. at 1362–63. 
 211. Id. at 1362. 
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part of the lake to create peninsulas to enhance the value of the upland lots.212  
The Army Corps of Engineers found that the lake was a protected wetland 
and denied the landowner’s request for a permit to dredge and fill the lake.213  
The landowner sought compensation, claiming that the 9.4 acres of lake-
bottom land was a separate property interest and therefore the permit denial 
constituted a Lucas total taking.214  Notwithstanding that the landowner had 
purchased the lake bottom and upland portions in different transactions with 
different instruments and held them with separate titles, the court held that 
the entire sixty-two acres should be treated as the denominator for purposes 
of the takings claim.215  According to the Federal Circuit, the lower court 
“properly looked to the economic reality of the arrangements, which 
transcended these legalistic bright lines.”216  Therefore, a complete 
prohibition on the use of nine out of sixty-two acres was held not to be a 
Lucas total taking.217 
The second case provides a striking contrast to the first.  In Lost Tree 
Village Corp. v. United States,218 (Lost Tree I) the landowner bought 
approximately 1300 acres on Florida’s mid-Atlantic coast and over the course 
of about twenty-five years developed most of the land into an upscale gated 
residential community.219  The community currently “includes two golf 
courses, a beach club, a private hotel, condominiums, and single family 
homes.”220  Ultimately, the landowner was left with just a couple of parcels 
of undeveloped land on a peninsula on the southernmost corner of its 
holdings.221  One of these parcels, Plat 57, is a 4.99-acre wetland.  When the 
Army Corps of Engineers denied the landowner’s request for a permit to fill 
and develop Plat 57 into a residential lot, the landowner filed a takings claim, 
arguing that Plat 57 itself should be the denominator and that the denial of 
the permit therefore constituted a total taking under Lucas.222  The Court of 
Federal Claims disagreed, holding that the relevant denominator was Plat 57, 
Plat 55 (a nearby developed plat), and some scattered wetlands, and therefore 
rejected the Lucas claim.223  The Federal Circuit, however, reversed, holding 
that Plat 57 alone was the relevant parcel for denominator purposes224 and 
concluding that the denial of a permit to dredge and fill Plat 57 was a Lucas 
total taking.225  Thus, in contrast to Forest Properties, a complete prohibition 
on the use of 4.99 out of 1300 acres was held to constitute a Lucas total 
taking. 
 
 212. Id. at 1363. 
 213. Id. at 1362–63. 
 214. Id. at 1364. 
 215. Id. at 1364–65. 
 216. Id. at 1366. 
 217. Id. at 1367. 
 218. 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 219. Id. at 1288. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1290. 
 222. Id. at 1293. 
 223. Id. at 1293–94. 
 224. Id. at 1294. 
 225. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1118–19 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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Notwithstanding the stark contrast between the outcomes of the two cases 
discussed above, the Federal Circuit’s resolution of these two cases was not 
necessarily as arbitrary as the bare factual presentation these examples might 
suggest.  In fact, the Federal Circuit has developed a multifactored inquiry 
for determining the relevant denominator.  The Court of Federal Claims 
explained the Federal Circuit’s approach to the Lucas denominator issue, 
noting that 
[o]n [the denominator] question, there is no bright-line rule; rather, the 
court takes “a flexible approach, designed to account for factual nuances.” 
. . . .  
The relevant-parcel analysis focuses on, among other things, “the 
owner’s actual and projected use of the property.”  Relevant takings 
precedent has yielded a number of factors that bear on the inquiry, 
including:  (1) the degree of contiguity between property interests, (2) the 
dates of acquisition of property interests, (3) the extent to which a parcel 
has been treated as a single income-producing unit, (4) the extent to which 
a common development scheme applied to the parcel, and (5) the extent to 
which the regulated lands enhance the value of the remaining lands.  The 
court previously also stated that a sixth factor, “(6) the extent to which any 
earlier development had reached completion and closure” was also a 
relevant consideration in the relevant-parcel analysis.226 
Over the years, other lower courts have developed their own multifactored 
tests for determining the denominator in Lucas total takings cases, employing 
many of the factors used by the Federal Circuit.227  Additional factors that 
courts have considered relevant for determining the appropriate denominator 
in Lucas total takings challenges include:  whether the parcels are divided by 
a road,228 the timing of the development of the parcels,229 whether the parcels 
are put to the same use or different uses,230 and the treatment of the parcels 
under state law.231 
In Murr, the Court effectively replaced these relatively objective, nuanced, 
and focused multifactored tests with a vague, broadly drawn three-factor 
inquiry that seeks to determine what “reasonable expectations about property 
ownership” reveal about the parcel and regulation at issue.232  These 
“reasonable expectations . . . derive from background customs and the whole 
 
 226. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412, 427–28 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 
1994); then quoting Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
and then quoting Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 718 (2010)). 
 227. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene v. Simpson, 136 P.3d 310, 321–24 (Idaho 2006); Giovanella 
v. Conservation Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 461–62 (Mass. 2006); K&K Constr., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 535–37 (Mich. 1998). 
 228. Coeur D’Alene, 136 P.3d at 321. 
 229. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 230. Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1178. 
 231. Coeur D’Alene, 136 P.3d at 310. 
 232. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017). 
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of our legal tradition.”233  As Ilya Somin observed, the Murr test “is a recipe 
for confusion, uncertainty, and constant litigation.”234 
As with the shadow Loretto doctrines developed to determine when a 
physical invasion is permanent rather than temporary, these shadow Lucas 
doctrines, including the new Murr test, belie the myth that the Court has 
created a total takings doctrine premised on bright-line rules.235  These 
shadow doctrines require fact-intensive inquiries to resolve the total takings 
claims, and the facts relevant to these inquiries are often far afield of the 
concerns that animate the Takings Clause. 
Moreover, in the Lucas context, the shadow doctrines are likely to be 
outcome determinative.  Because landowners rarely prevail on regulatory 
takings claims that do not fall within one of the purported bright-line 
categories of the total takings myth,236 the denominator determination in 
Lucas claims is usually outcome determinative.  Either the denominator is 
determined to be coextensive with the regulated parcel and the landowner 
prevails under Lucas, or the denominator is determined to be larger than the 
affected parcel and the court applies the Penn Central factors, in which case 
the landowner will rarely prevail.237  The Murr Court recognized the risk that 
“the answer to [the denominator] question might be outcome-determinative,” 
but insisted that “[d]efining the property at the outset . . . should not 
necessarily preordain the outcome in every case.”238   
Ultimately, however, the Court’s own actions betrayed its assertion.  After 
thoroughly evaluating the denominator under its new multifactored test, the 
Court concluded that the appropriate denominator included both parcels, 
which effectively ruled out a viable Lucas total takings claim.  The Court 
then dispatched Petitioners’ Penn Central claim with a scant four-sentence 
paragraph.239  Thus, by preordaining the result of the Penn Central inquiry, 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Somin, supra note 117. 
 235. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 93, 112 (2002) (“A supposedly clear categorical takings rule that is applied this 
unpredictably and infrequently, with such large exceptions and qualifications, is not much of 
a rule.”). 
 236. See Michelman, supra note 99, at 1621 (“In all the years between 1922 and 1987, 
however, the Court never once clearly applied the open-ended balancing test in favor of a 
takings claim and against a regulating government.”). 
 237. See Dana, supra note 11, at 634 (“What would be the result of a regime where ‘the 
property’ almost always or always was the exact area restricted by regulation?  In many cases, 
the result would be a finding by the court that the relevant ‘property’ had been deprived of all 
economically viable use or reduced to zero market value, and that the government therefore 
owed just compensation.”); McConnell, supra note 19, at 315 (“Regulatory takings are subject 
to a vague and forgiving balancing test—the Penn Central test—that almost never results in 
compensation being due.”). 
 238. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 239. Id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority assures that, under its test, 
‘[d]efining the property . . . should not necessarily preordain the outcome in every case.’  The 
underscored language cheapens the assurance.”). 
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the Murr denominator test will swallow not only the purported bright-line 
rule of Lucas but also the entire regulatory takings inquiry.240 
IV.  REPUDIATING THE TOTAL TAKINGS MYTH 
Where does this leave us?  As demonstrated above, over the past thirty-
five years the Court has created three purported per se rules within regulatory 
takings jurisprudence that are doctrinally and theoretically incoherent and 
impossible for lower courts to apply.  As a result, the total takings myth has 
fostered more, not less, confusion in regulatory takings law.  Given the 
opportunity in Murr to resolve some of the incoherence in one branch of the 
total takings doctrine, the Court merely exacerbated the problem.  Moreover, 
by focusing the attention of litigants and lower courts on the contours of these 
purported bright lines, the total takings myth has interfered with the important 
work of clarifying foundational regulatory takings doctrine.  In response to 
the chaos it has created, the Court is presented with two choices—it can either 
clarify its bright-line rules or it can repudiate the total takings myth and 
refocus its attention on refining the Penn Central balancing test to more fairly 
and consistently implement its regulatory takings doctrine.241  The time has 
come for the Court to end the total takings charade and repudiate the total 
takings myth, beginning by overruling Lucas. 
A.  The Problem with Bright-Line Rules in Regulatory Takings Law 
The total takings myth was adopted as part of the Court’s, and particularly 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s,242 attempt to replace constitutional standards with 
constitutional rules in the 1980s and early 1990s.243  As noted above, the total 
takings rules were justified in part by the benefits of carving out a small 
portion of otherwise messy regulatory takings claims for easy resolution.244  
The bright-line rules, however, have been anything but easy to implement.  
Indeed, rather than readily resolving a small portion of regulatory takings 
litigation, the total takings myth has made fixing the boundaries of these 
purported bright-line rules the focus of regulatory takings claims.  The 
 
 240. Id. at 1956 (“In deciding whether there is a taking under [the Penn Central factors], 
the regulation will seem eminently reasonable given its impact on the pre-packaged parcel.  
Not, as the Court assures us, ‘necessarily’ in ‘every’ case, but surely in most.”). 
 241. Of course, a third option also begs for consideration:  the Court could reject the entire 
regulatory takings doctrine as misguided. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 1077 (arguing 
that the Takings Clause requires compensation only when the government “uses” private 
property, not when it merely regulates the landowner’s use of the property); Mark Tunick, 
Constitutional Protections of Private Property:  Decoupling the Takings and Due Process 
Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 887–88 (2001) (arguing that land use regulations should 
be evaluated for constitutional validity under the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause).  
I leave consideration of this option to a future paper. 
 242. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
22, 83 (1992) (“Justice Scalia, more than any other current Justice, favors operative rules and 
condemns operative standards.”).  See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 243. Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 227, 231 (1984); Sullivan, supra note 242 at 77–83. 
 244. See supra Introduction. 
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struggles of the lower courts in their attempts to determine and clarify the 
edges of the Lucas and Loretto bright-line rules, and their ultimate resort to 
standards and multifactored tests, suggests the difficulties the Supreme Court 
might encounter if it seeks to sharpen those rules into actual bright lines. 
Even if the Court could crystallize the edges of the total takings doctrine 
into actual bright-line rules, it should not do so.  Much has been written about 
the relative virtues of rules and standards, and this Article does not intend to 
add to that literature.245  It is sufficient to note the broad outlines of consensus 
regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of each type of legal 
standard.  It is widely accepted that bright-line rules are best suited to 
circumstances where certainty and ease of administration are more important 
than precision and particularized decision-making.246  Bright-line rules focus 
on one or two triggering facts and limit the discretion of the decision-maker 
once those facts are determined, thereby sacrificing fine-grained equity for 
broad-stroke goals, such as predictability and administrability.247  As a result, 
bright-line rules facilitate advance planning, offer ease of administration, and 
limit the potential for arbitrary decision-making.248  At the same time, bright-
line rules are likely to be both over- and under-inclusive, thereby sacrificing 
particularized equity based on relevant circumstances.249 
Standards, in contrast, permit consideration of multiple relevant factors 
and provide a decision-maker discretion to tailor the legal outcome to the 
particularized facts of each case.250  As a result, standards offer less 
predictability than rules and are costlier to implement, but they are thought 
to provide a more just and fair result in each particular case.251 
Advocates of bright-line rules in regulatory takings doctrine celebrate the 
potential for clarity, efficiency, notice, and property rights protection offered 
by takings formalism.252  But even if these benefits were achievable, they 
come at a steep cost—the loss of circumstantial justice and fairness.253 
Regulatory takings law is quintessentially about justice and fairness.  As 
the Court has often repeated, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
 
 245. For an overview and synopsis of the relative strengths and weakness of rules and 
standards, see Sullivan, supra note 242, at 57–69.  For the seminal discussion of rules and 
standards in the context of property law, see CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Property 
Law, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 199, 199 (1994).  The general discussion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of rules and standards that follows draws heavily from these two important 
works. 
 246. See Sullivan, supra note 242, at 58. 
 247. Id. at 62–63. 
 248. Id. at 62. 
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 250. Id. at 58–59. 
 251. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:  Rules vs. 
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 33 (2000). 
 252. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas:  Exactions and 
the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2004) (detailing the potential 
benefits of bright-line rules in regulatory takings doctrine). 
 253. See id. at 652–81 (discussing the ways in which “disappointment and frustration” are 
“endemic to takings formalism”).  
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designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”254  The doctrine is purposefully ad hoc and multifaceted,255 and the 
Court has “frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be 
rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses 
proximately caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances 
[in that] case.’”256  While regulatory takings law serves other values as 
well,257 the Court has consistently and adamantly insisted that fairness and 
justice are the central concerns of the regulatory takings doctrine.258 
But, as they stand now, the Court’s total takings rules are the antithesis of 
justice and fairness.  Instead, these bright-line rules create takings “cliffs and 
ledges”259—a property owner whose land is regulated right up to the edge of 
the precipice receives no compensation at all, while a landowner whose 
property is regulated over the cliff is compensated for 100 percent of the 
value of her property.  Justice John Paul Stevens highlighted the inequity of 
the Lucas takings cliff in his dissent in Lucas:  “In addition to lacking support 
in past decisions, the Court’s new rule is wholly arbitrary. A landowner 
whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner 
whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land’s full value.”260  A 
similar cliff is created by the bright-line rule in Loretto, such that a landowner 
subjected to a substantial physical invasion that is long-lasting but not quite 
permanent (say, ninety-nine years) would likely not be entitled to any 
compensation, while a landowner subject to a so-called permanent physical 
occupation would be fully compensated.261 
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Similarly, the bright-line rules of the total takings myth create takings 
contradictions in which seemingly identically situated landowners are treated 
differently based on idiosyncrasies unrelated to any purpose underlying 
Takings Clause doctrine.  For example, under Lucas, if a landowner owns a 
one-acre lot and a land use restriction prohibits all use of one-half of the lot, 
the landowner will not be entitled to compensation.  But if her neighbor owns 
two separate one-half acre lots and is prohibited from all use of one of those 
separate lots, she will be fully compensated.262  Similarly, under Horne II, a 
person subject to an order to turn over $400,000 worth of raisins as part of a 
market regulatory scheme is entitled to full compensation under the Takings 
Clause, while a person ordered to turn over $400,000 in fees for a similar 
scheme would not be entitled to any compensation.263  The takings cliffs and 
contradictions created by the total takings myth are the antithesis of the 
fairness and justice goals of regulatory takings doctrine. 
Not only are these takings cliffs and contradictions arbitrary and unfair, 
they create adverse incentives for land ownership and takings litigation.264  
The Lucas bright-line rule encourages landowners to structure their holdings 
in the smallest possible legal unit to take advantage of the Lucas rule if the 
state imposes land use restrictions on their property in the future.  Justice 
Stevens foresaw precisely this adverse incentive in his dissent in Lucas:  
“[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized estates to take advantage 
of the Court’s new rule.  The smaller the estate, the more likely that a 
regulatory change will effect a total taking.”265  The Lucas bright-line rule 
also encourages takings claimants to characterize every regulatory takings 
claim as a Lucas claim in order to avoid having to litigate their challenges 
under the Penn Central test.266  This distortion in litigation practices wastes 
judicial resources and diverts the attention of lower courts from the important 
task of implementing and refining the Penn Central factors. 
B.  The Return to Standards in Regulatory Takings Law 
Because bright-line rules have no place in regulatory takings doctrine, the 
Court should begin the task of dismantling the total takings myth.  Doing so 
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would not be hard for the Court to justify.267  Under any but the most 
restrictive views of the Court’s authority (and obligation) to revisit erroneous 
constitutional precedent, a decision to renounce the total takings myth should 
be a simple one. 
In a constitutional democracy, adherence to precedent is a “foundation 
stone of the rule of law”268 that “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles [and] fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions.”269  And the Court has made clear that “[c]onsiderations in favor 
of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract 
rights.”270  Still, constitutional precedent is not immutable,271 and the Court 
has a particular obligation to revisit erroneous constitutional precedent 
because it is the only branch of government that can readily reverse a 
mistaken constitutional interpretation.272  Thus, while the Court employs a 
presumption against overruling its prior cases,273 it nonetheless will do so if 
consideration of several relevant factors demonstrates that the values of stare 
decisis should give way to the importance of coherent, correct constitutional 
interpretation.  In Citizens United v. FEC,274 the Court announced factors 
relevant to analyzing continued reliance on constitutional precedents, 
including:  (1) how long the precedent has been in existence, (2) the reliance 
interests at stake in changing the legal rule, (3) whether the precedent is 
workable in lower courts, and (4) whether the original decision announcing 
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the precedent was well reasoned.275  All of these factors counsel in favor of 
repudiating the total takings myth. 
In fact, the Court recently corrected another mistake in its regulatory 
takings jurisprudence when it jettisoned a long-standing regulatory takings 
rule with little fanfare in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.276  Twenty-five years 
before Lingle, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,277 the Supreme Court first stated 
that a regulation of private property “effects a taking if [it] does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests.”278  In the ensuing years, the 
Court repeated that legal standard often, and it eventually became “ensconced 
in . . . Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence.”279  The Court itself, 
however, never actually held a regulation to be a compensable taking on the 
basis of the “substantially advance” test.280  Finally, when the Ninth Circuit 
applied the test in an outcome-determinative manner in 2004, the Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.281  Conceding that its original use of the 
“substantially advance” formula in Agins was “regrettably imprecise,”282 the 
Court explained that test sounds more in the nature of due process than 
regulatory takings and therefore it “is not a valid method of discerning 
whether private property has been ‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.”283  In Lingle the Court never mentioned stare decisis and did 
not invoke the stare decisis factors mentioned above.  Rather, the Court 
simply announced that the “substantially advances” test “is not a valid 
takings test” and thereby repudiated a takings myth that had been circulating 
for decades.284 
Commentators have lauded Lingle and the Court’s decision to reverse 
course and disentangle substantive due process from takings claims, largely 
because the substantive due process language was detracting from the 
development of core regulatory takings doctrine.285  As Mark Fenster 
observed, 
Viewed four years later, Lingle’s narrow project of separating regulatory 
takings from substantive due process has been largely successful.  Courts 
no longer apply stray language from an earlier decision that Lingle struck 
from the overstuffed box of key phrases that compose the takings canon, 
 
 275. See id. at 362–63. 
 276. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 277. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 278. Id. at 260. 
 279. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531. 
 280. Id. at 546 (“[I]n no case have we found a compensable taking based on [a substantially 
advance] inquiry.  Indeed, in most of the cases reciting the ‘substantially advances’ formula, 
the Court has merely assumed its validity when referring to it in dicta.”).  
 281. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 849–55 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 282. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 545. 
 285. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity:  The Potential Long-Term 
Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 343, 349 (2006); J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims after Lingle, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 471, 471–72 (2007); Fenster, supra note 252, at 527. 
88 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
and they now seem to understand the distinction between takings and 
substantive due process claims.286 
Benjamin Barros agreed, arguing that by eliminating substantive due 
process language from regulatory takings claims “the Court took at least a 
modest step in clarifying its regulatory takings doctrine” and created “great 
potential” for further clarification.287 
The total takings myth should not be much more difficult to dispatch than 
Lingle, and the repudiation of the purported bright-line rules will provide 
similar jurisprudential benefits.  The Lucas doctrine should be the first to go, 
because it causes the most mischief in the lower courts and is the least 
justifiable of the total takings rules.  Applying the Citizens United factors, 
Lucas is an easy case for overturning a failed precedent:  (1) the original 
Lucas opinion is widely perceived to be poorly reasoned and dramatically 
undertheorized,288 (2) it has proved unworkable in the lower courts,289 (3) it 
has been on the books for almost twenty-five years, and (4) landowners 
cannot assert any legitimate or reasonable reliance on its holding.290  The 
Court’s recent decision in Murr is certain to generate a flood of Lucas total 
takings litigation, so the Court will have ample opportunity in the near future 
to apply the Citizens United factors and overturn Lucas.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court missed an important opportunity to begin the work of 
dismantling the total takings myth in Murr.  Overruling Lucas would be an 
important first step toward addressing and resolving the very real problems 
still plaguing the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.  Although the 
Court has repeatedly said that the Lucas total takings rule should apply only 
“exceedingly rarely,”291 it is, in fact, invoked in a large number of regulatory 
takings cases.292  Removing the siren’s call of Lucas from regulatory takings 
doctrine will eliminate the adverse incentives that drive litigants to cast their 
run-of-the-mill regulatory takings claims as total takings claims and will 
redirect judicial attention to the merits of underlying regulatory takings 
claims.  The Court’s current approach to regulatory takings, encapsulated in 
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the Penn Central factors, is much in need of refinement or redefinition.293  
Dismantling the total takings doctrine will make room for that important 
work. 
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